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This paper illustrates the extent of implicit taxpayer subsidies under four possible 
income contingent loan (ICL) arrangements for Thailand: TICAL, implemented in 
2007 only, a variant of TICAL, and two alternative ICL schemes. The implicit 
taxpayer subsidy calculated with respect to average graduate earnings for TICAL-type 
arrangements is between 25-40 per cent; however, the average implicit subsidies for 
the two alternatives are close to zero.  
 
When account is taken of disaggregated graduate earnings, the subsidies for TICAL-
type schemes increase to about 30-55 per cent. The subsidy is between 3-18 per cent 
for our alternative ICLs, depending on the form of the real rate of interest incurred. 
These results show that there is a viable ICL alternative to TICAL, which are of 
greatest benefit for low levels of debt. When the debt is relatively large the subsidies 
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 1 Introduction 
 
In 2007, for one year only, Thailand introduced an income contingent loan system for 
higher education, known as the Thai Income Contingent Allowance and Loan system 
(TICAL). TICAL was based on Australia’s Higher Education Contribution Scheme 
(HECS), an income contingent loan system in which tuition charges are collected 
through the income tax system depending on a student’s future income. HECS was 
instituted in 1989, and similar student loan policies commenced over the 1990s and 
beyond in, among other countries, New Zealand, Chile, South Africa, Ethiopia, 
Hungary and the UK. Other countries, notably Colombia and Israel, are involved 
currently in research-based debate on the usefulness of income contingent loan 
approaches to higher education financing. 
 
This paper examines the conceptual bases of alternative student loan systems, and it is 
argued that income contingent approaches are generally seen to be desirable 
arrangements compared to alternatives. However, such an assessment is associated 
with two extremely important qualifications: one is that the administrative institutions 
of a country are such as to allow efficacious collection of a former student’s debt; and 
two, is that an income contingent scheme needs to be properly designed with respect 
to some key parameters.  
 
We are unable to ascertain with complete certainty if potential Thai collection 
arrangements are such as to enable efficient and fair collection of an income 
contingent loan, and we leave the answer to that critical question to administrative, tax 
and/or social security specialists
1. Our aim instead is to throw significant light on the 
second concern, the importance of design parameters with respect to the likely 
outcomes of such a system, with our focus being on the critical issue of implicit 
taxpayer interest rate subsidies. Internationally this is now perhaps the most important 
non-administrative design issue for an assessment of the efficacy of income 
contingent loan schemes. 
 
Interest rate subsidies, along with loan repayment hardships, have been explored in 
Chapman, Lounkaew, Polsiri, Sarachitti and Sitthiponpanich (2008) (from now on, 
Chapman et al. (2008), which is concerned with analysis of the previous Thai student 
loan scheme, the Student Loan Fund. Chapman et al. (2008) and our analysis use 
exactly the same data set and empirical methods so we can compare and contrast 
confidently the effects of disparate past and prospective Thailand student loan 
arrangements. 
 
While interest rate subsidies are a major aspect of our paper, it is useful to make a 
comment on the other major component of the Chapman et al. (2008) analysis, so-
called repayment hardships associated with the SLF. The results of their research are 
summarized below, and it is important to recognize that one of the principal benefits 
of an income contingent loan system is that, unless the loan is designed poorly, it is 
not possible to incur important repayment hardships, as measured by the proportion of 
a graduate’s income that needs to be allocated to the repayment or a student loan. That 
                                                 
1 The analysis below of requirements suggests the importance of being able to collect the debt on the 
basis of observed lifetime incomes, and this might imply for Thailand the use of the social security 
system instead of the income tax system. With the former there are already income contingent 
collections of funds for pensions.   2
is, because such a loan is repaid up to a maximum percentage of income, there will 
not be repayment hardships. In the Australian system this maximum is 8 per cent, and 
for TICAL it is 12 per cent; for mortgage-type loans these figures could be very 
different. 
 
However, there are important reasons to explore the findings of Chapman et al. (2008) 
with respect to implicit interest subsidies for the SLF and, in this paper, various forms 
of an income contingent loan for Thailand. As implied above, all the authors 
collaborated closely in the two exercises in order to be in a position to make similarly-
based assessments of the effects of the different schemes in terms of subsidies. 
 
The Chapman et al. (2008) results can be compared to our findings for two different 
interpretations of how TICAL might have worked in practice had it not been 
discontinued, as well as with an alternative proposed income contingent loan scheme 
for Thailand. Two versions of the latter are explained and explored, with these 
variants having been motivated by our curiosity with respect to the possible role 
played by different forms of the requirement that former students cover, at least in 
part, the opportunity cost to the government of borrowing to finance the income 
contingent loan. As with Chapman et al. (2008), we use not only average predicted 
lifetime graduate incomes for our empirical exercises, but low, median and high 
estimates of incomes as well, and for both sexes. 
 
Our estimates and calculations illustrate the empirical significance of different levels 
of income thresholds for repayment, and for disparate approaches to the imposition of 
real rates of interest for a wide spectrum of graduate incomes, and take into account 
the possible roles of graduate unemployment rates and potential loan losses associated 
with collection inefficiencies. The findings suggest that in design terms there is a 
viable option for an income contingent loan scheme for Thailand, but this conclusion 
seems to be more credible for relatively low levels of debt than for the sizes of tuition 
that are more likely to be associated with higher price private institutions. 
 
2  Traditional Student and Income Contingent Loan Schemes: 
Conceptual Issues 
 
2 (i) The need for government intervention in higher education financing 
 
A significant financing issue for higher education is that there is generally seen to be a 
case for both a contribution from students and a taxpayer subsidy (Barr, 2001; 
Chapman, 2006). An important question is: is there a role for government beyond the 
provision of the subsidy?  
 
An understanding of the issue is facilitated through consideration of what would 
happen if there were no higher education financing assistance involving the public 
sector. That is, a government, convinced that there should be a subsidy, could simply 
provide the appropriate level of taxpayer support to higher education institutions, and 
then leave market mechanisms to take their course. Presumably this would result in 
institutions charging students up-front on enrolment for the service. 
  
However, there are major problems with this arrangement, traceable in most instances 
to the potent presence of risk and uncertainty. This critical point was first raised in   3
Friedman (1955). The argument can be best understood with reference to the nexus 
between labor markets and human capital investments. The essential point is that 




(i)  Enrolling students do not know fully their capacities for (and perhaps even 
true interest in) the higher education discipline of their choice. This means 
in an extreme they cannot be sure that they will graduate with, in Australia 
for example, around 25 per cent of students ending up without a 
qualification;  
 
(ii)  Even given that university completion is expected, students will not be 
aware of their likely relative success in the area of study. This will depend 
not just on their own abilities, but also on the skills of others competing for 
jobs in the area;  
 
(iii)  There is uncertainty concerning the future value of the investment. For 
example, the labor market — including the labor market for graduates in 
specific skill areas — is undergoing constant change. What looked like a 
good investment at the time it began might turn out to be a poor choice 
when the process is finished; and 
 
(iv)  Many prospective students, particularly those from disadvantaged 
backgrounds, may not have much information concerning graduate 
incomes, due in part to a lack of contact with graduates. 
 
These uncertainties are associated with important risks for both borrowers and 
lenders. The important point is that if the future incomes of students turn out to be 
lower than expected, the individual is unable to sell part of the investment to re-
finance a different educational path, for example. For a prospective lender, a bank, the 
risk is compounded by the reality that in the event of a student borrower defaulting on 
the loan obligation, there is no available collateral to be sold, a fact traceable in part to 
the illegality of slavery. And even if it was possible for a third party to own and sell 
human capital, its future value might turn out to be quite low taking into account the 
above-noted uncertainties associated with higher education investments. 
 
It follows that, left to itself — and even with subsidies from the government to cover 
the value of externalities — the market will not deliver propitious higher education 
outcomes. Prospective students judged to be relatively risky, and/or those without 
loan repayment guarantors, will not be able to access the financial resources required 
for both the payment of tuition and to cover income support. There would be 
efficiency losses (talented but poor prospective students would be excluded), and 
distributional inequities (the non-attainment of equality of educational opportunity). 
Government intervention of some form is thus required. 
 
The capital market failure with respect to higher education financing is apparently 
understood by the governments of most countries, given that public sector loan 
interventions are commonplace internationally. Until recently, government 
                                                 
2 As discussed by Barr (2001), Palacios (2004) and Chapman (2006).   4
intervention often took the form of public sector guarantees for commercial bank 
provision of education loans, but over the last decade or so has increasingly involved 
income contingent loans. While quite different in practice, both approaches are 
motivated in part by the recognition that, left alone, higher education markets will 
function poorly.  
 
 
2 (ii) The costs and benefits of mortgage-type loans 
   
A possible solution to the capital market problem described above is used in many 
countries is the provision of student loans — either directly by the government or 
indirectly through guarantees of repayments to banks by the government in the event 
of default. Typically, and most simply, these loans involve fixed repayments, as, for 
example, with a house mortgage. While this seems to address the capital market 
failure, it raises other problems. 
 
Students face an important default issue. This is that some may be reluctant to borrow 
for fear of not being able to meet future repayment obligations. Not being able to meet 
repayment obligations has the potential to inflict significant damage to a person’s 
credit reputation (and thus access to future borrowing, for example, for the purchase 
of a house). These concerns imply that there will be less borrowing than there would 
be in the absence of this default concern. 
 
A reluctance to borrow due to the uncertainty of repayment constitutes what might be 
labeled an ex ante default problem for prospective students. There is also an ex post 
problem, which is that a proportion of those students who took the credit risk of 
borrowing for a human capital investment will end up not being able to repay because 
of low incomes. In these circumstances default imposes a potentially large cost on 
those unlucky borrowers who do poorly in the labor market. Significantly, research 
suggests that members of the default group are predominantly those who ultimately 
experienced relatively high unemployment rates and relatively low earnings
3. 
 
The prospect and consequences of a student defaulting on a loan obligation is a 
potentially critical issue for borrowing to finance human capital investments, due to 
the uncertainties noted above. A consequence is that some eligible prospective 
students will not be prepared to take bank loans. This problem can be traced, in part, 
to the fact that bank loan repayments are insensitive to the borrower’s financial 
circumstances.  
A final possible practical problem of government guaranteed bank loans relates to the 
fact that in many countries loans of this type are not universally available, or available 
loan levels are limited
4. This is because loan provision and/or amounts available are 
usually means-tested on the basis of family income.  This raises the important issue 
explained by Carneiro and Heckman (2002), concerning the role of the sharing of 
                                                 
3 Dynarski (1994) used the National Post-secondary Student Aid Study and found strong evidence that 
experiencing low earnings after leaving formal education is a strong determinant of default. 
Importantly, borrowers from low-income households, and minorities, were more likely to default, as 
were those who did not complete their studies. 
4 Eligibility for Canada student loans is limited to less than half of all students (Finnie and Swartz, 
1994).   5
financial resources within families. Some students will be unable to access necessary 
levels of borrowing and will face the same credit market failure as they would in the 
absence of a government guarantee of a bank loan. Making loans available on a means 
tested basis (as is the case in the US and Canada) suggests that some prospective 
students will have difficulties accessing the system.  
The bottom line is that, even though government assisted conventional loans are a 
common form internationally of public sector involvement in higher education 
financing, such an approach has several apparently very significant weaknesses. 
 
2 (iii) The costs and benefits of income contingent loans 
      
A different approach to student financing involves income contingent loans, such as 
Australia’s HECS. The attraction of these schemes is that they can be designed to 
avoid many of the problems associated with alternative financing policies. 
  
First, there is no concern with intra-family sharing so long as the scheme is universal. 
That is, no students would be denied access through the imposition of means-testing 
arrangements that could exclude some whose parents or partners who are unwilling to 
help. 
 
Second, given an efficient collection mechanism, there is no default issue as such for 
the government. That is, if the tax system works well and is used to collect the debt (at 
least for Australia, this is essential because the Australian Taxation Office is the only 
institution with reasonably good information on a former students’ income), it is 
extremely difficult for the vast majority of graduates to avoid repayment. There is a 
form of a default issue in that some students will not pay back in full, because income 
contingent systems are designed to excuse some former student’s payments because 
their lifetime incomes are too low. Harding (1995) calculates that the total repayments 
remaining uncollected because of the nature of HECS would be of the order of 20 per 
cent for the original scheme (when the repayment conditions were particularly 
generous for the student). Other reasons loans may not be repaid include death and 
emigration. 
 
Third, because repayments depend on income, there should be no concerns by 
students with respect to incapacity to repay the debt, or hardships associated with 
repayments. That is, once an individual’s income determines repayment, and so long 
as the repayment parameters are sufficiently generous, it is not possible to default or 
hardship because of a lack of capacity to pay. This is the critical practical advantage 
of income contingent collection schemes — unlike any other form of assistance, there 
is insurance against default and repayment difficulties 
 
Income contingent schemes have significant advantages over alternative financing 
arrangements, in that they can be designed to avoid the major problems of their 
alternatives. This does not make such approaches a panacea generally, however: for 
an income contingent scheme to be made operational it is essential that there is an 
efficient administrative collection mechanism.  
 
The matter of collection is of great importance for the introduction of income 
contingent loans in countries without the necessary institutional apparatus. Chapman   6
(2006) argues that the minimum conditions for a successful income contingent loan 
seem to be: 
 
(i)  accurate record-keeping of the accruing liabilities of students;  
 
(ii)  an effective collection mechanism with a sound, and if possible, 
computerized record-keeping system; and 
 
(iii)  an efficient way of determining with accuracy, over time, the actual 
incomes of former students. 
 
While most OECD countries will have income tax or social security systems that 
enable efficient collection of income contingent debts, it is very unlikely that 
developing countries have the capacity to meet requirement (iii) above. This issue 
requires critical attention in the Thai policy context. 
 
3  The Student Loan Fund, TICAL and the Need for Alternatives 
 
3 (i) The recent history of student loans in Thailand 
 
A loan scheme for Thailand´s higher education students, known as the Student Loan 
Fund, was introduced in 1996, and has been analyzed extensively by Ziderman (2003) 
and Chapman et al. (2008).  The main features of the loan scheme are documented in 
Chapman et al. (2008) with the most important design issues for our purposes being 
as follows. 
 
The SLF is in essence a traditional student loan scheme, with a fixed repayment 
period of 15 years after a grace period of two years, but with the novel feature that the 
proportion of the total debt repayment obligation increases with time, starting at 1.5 
per cent in the first year and reaching 13 per cent of the total debt in the final year. 
This aspect of the SLF can be seen to be a part-concession to the benefits of income 
contingent loans, since the repayment obligations will be correlated with increases in 
average earnings with age, as is clear from the analysis presented in this paper. What 
these arrangements mean for repayment hardship is summarized below.  
 
An important feature of the SLF relates to the nature of the interest rate subsidies. As 
pointed out in Ziderman (2003) and Chapman et al. (2008), these arise principally 
from: the zero nominal interest rate in the period before repayment begins; and that 
the nominal interest rate of 1 per cent per annum, when imposed, is significantly 
below the true cost of borrowing for the government of perhaps 2 to 3 per cent in real 
terms per year. The importance of these arrangements in an understanding of the 
overall interest rate subsidies is summarized below. 
 
In 2007 the SLF was suspended and was replaced by (the short lived) TICAL. The 
main design features of TICAL, and their financial implications, are explained and 
examined in detail below. In 2008 TICAL was replaced with what is essentially a new 
form of the SLF, but with the same fixed repayment period of 17 years. This new 
scheme has not been analyzed by Chapman et al. (2008) and nor will it be explored 
here, but it is very likely that the new loan system’s implications for both repayment 
hardship and interest rate subsidies are very similar to those of the SLF.   7
 
 
3 (ii) The effects of the SLF in summary: Repayment hardship and interest rate 
subsidies 
 
The paper for this conference by Chapman et al. (2008) analyzed two critical aspects 
of the Thai former SLF: repayment hardships and interest rate subsidies. The former 
is defined as the proportion of a graduate’s income that is used to repay the loan, and 
is calculated for both graduates earning average incomes in the periods of repayment, 
and so-called “unlucky graduates” who earn in the bottom 10 per cent of the graduate 
income distribution by age and sex.  
 
For the same sample of graduates used in this paper, and using the same methods to 
project graduate incomes by age and sex, Chapman et al. (2008) find that the 
measures of repayment hardships on average are around 4 and 3.5 per cent for females 
and males. For the “unlucky graduates” the results are about 12.4 and 9.7 per cent for 
females and males. It is reasonable to describe these outcomes as fairly low, certainly 




Related to the above finding is that the SLF delivers very considerable interest rate 
subsidies, of the order of 67 per cent overall, a finding very similar to that found also 
for the SLF by Ziderman (2003). These very high subsidies are explained by a 
combination of policy parameters, but by far the most important empirically can be 
traced to the fact that SLF debt is adjusted annually by a nominal rate of interest of 
only 1 per cent, implying a real rate of interest of about  -3 per cent per annum. 
Interest rate subsidies are a very important aspect of the Thailand student loan debate, 
and they are now considered further with respect to the design of alternative possible 
income contingent loan schemes for the country. 
 
3 (iii) TICAL and an alternative form of an ICL described 
 
TICAL was motivated by the perceived benefits of ICL considered in section 2, 
although it is reasonable to suggest that there are some controversial design aspects of 
the scheme. There are several important and arguably contentious design issues 
associated with scheme that are addressed in our empirical exercises. 
 
The first relates to the first income threshold of repayment, set at 192,000 Baht per 
year, which seems to be very high given the age-earnings profiles of graduates 
presented below
6. This particularly matters if the debt has no real rate of interest, since 
it is necessarily the case that the longer it takes to repay a government loan which 
does not have a real rate of interest the greater is the size of the associated subsidies 
from taxpayers. A major goal in what follows is to illustrate the empirical significance 
of this feature of TICAL. 
 
                                                 
5  Recent calculations by Bruce Chapman and Colombian education officials illustrate that for the 
ICETEX loan scheme in that country the repayment hardship results for “unlucky graduates” in that 
country are of the order of 35-45 per cent. 
6 For example, from the data presented in this paper it would seem to take an average female graduate 
around 12 years before any TICAL repayments are made.   8
Because the first income threshold of repayment of TICAL seems to be very high, we 
suggest a different income contingent loan model for Thailand for illustrative 
purposes, and we label this ILLUSTRATIVE. It has two repayment features different 
to TICAL: one, the first income threshold of repayment is very much lower, at 
100,000 Baht per year; and two, the rates of repayment we have chosen are much 
closer to those of HECS, meaning that they are considerably lower than is the case for 
TICAL, particularly at high levels of income. Table 1 presents the repayment 




Repayment Thresholds and Collection Parameters (per cent of taxable income)
7 
of Different Income Contingent Loan Schemes for Thailand 
TICAL ILLUSTRATIVE   
 












Less than 192,000  0  Less than 100,000  0 
192,000-360,000 0.05  100,000-110,000  0.03 
360,001-840,000 0.08  110,001-120,000  0.04 
Higher than 840,000  0.12  120,001-130,000  0.05 
    





A second design issue concerns the indexation arrangements with respect to the 
income thresholds of repayments and this is a critical point in trying to understand 
what the effects of TICAL might have been. The concern is that it is not clear if the 
income threshold of repayment of the loan was to be indexed, and to what, as is the 
case for all relevant parameters of Australia’s HECS, for example. To address this we 
raise two possibilities. 
 
The first possibility is that the income thresholds are eventually indexed to average 
nominal wage increases, but we are unsure what this means in a Thai context in which 
regular indexing is typically not part of the economic policy fabric. To illustrate the 
significance of this possibility, however, it is necessary that an indexation 
arrangement of some form is imposed and the one we have chosen is full (assumed to 
be 5 per cent per annum) wage indexation being imposed 10 years after the initiation 
of the policy, and continuing annually after that. This scenario of eventual indexation 
of the repayment thresholds is referred to from now as TICAL1. 
 
                                                 
7 This form of collection is the same as that used in the Australian loan scheme, HECS, in which once a 
given threshold of income is reached a given proportion of total income is owed. While this seems to 
imply an extremely high effective marginal tax arte at the first income threshold, work by Chapman 
and Leigh (2007) suggest this has only small behavioral effects.   9
The second possibility is that the TICAL thresholds are not to be not indexed, 
meaning that over time as nominal wages increase the threshold becomes effectively 
lower and graduates would increasingly be repaying their debts earlier; in the event of 
real interest rate subsidies this would mean lower taxpayer subsidies over time. This 
unindexed scenario is referred to from now as TICAL2. 
 
A third, related, and controversial aspect of TICAL is that there is no real rate of 
interest on the debt, with an adjustment being made annually to a student’s or 
graduate’s debt for changes in the CPI only. This aspect of the scheme looks to be 
identical to Australia’s HECS arrangement, but there is a critical difference. This is 
that for HECS there is a 20 per cent discount for an up-front payment of the tuition 
obligation, which in effect means that students choosing to take the debt are subject to 
a 25 per cent surcharge
8 (meaning that effectively there is a blunt form of a real 
interest rate for HECS). The motivation for analyzing in depth the conceptual issues 
associated with interest rate regimes, and for providing an empirical approach to 
explore this further, are now considered. 
 
  3 (iv) Understanding the role of the form of real interest rates 
 
The issue of interest rate subsidies in student loan schemes is extremely important. 
Moreover, there are major differences between countries even with apparently similar 
approaches to income contingent loan policies. As examples: given the write-off of 
the interest rate of loans in nominal terms in New Zealand, the effective interest rate 
for that country is negative in real terms; for both the UK and TICAL the real rate of 
interest is zero; and for HECS there is a surcharge on the debt once it is incurred, but 
the on-going adjustment of the debt is equal only to the rate of price inflation.  
 
There are important disagreements between researchers on the appropriate level and 
form of a rate of interest on the debt associated with income contingent loans. Barr 
(2007) makes a compelling case that the Australian form which uses a surcharge 
introduces distortions in both efficiency and equity terms, although on average it still 
means that there is some attempt to require students to contribute to the government’s 
opportunity costs of borrowing. Chapman (2006) argues that the issue is quite 
complex in the case of an income contingent loan, since such schemes are designed to 
offer insurance against the costs of poor future outcomes, and in the case of a former 
student experiencing low future incomes they may find themselves in an ex post 
situation of accumulating high real debts due simply to unpredictable poor luck. 
 
Three broad points can be highlighted: 
 
(i)  There is a strong case for an income contingent loan scheme to require 
borrowers to contribute to diminishing the costs of borrowing for the 
government of the loan (which must mean that both the UK scheme and 
TICAL, and now the New Zealand system, have important design 
weaknesses); 
 
                                                 
8 This can be explained as follows. If there is a charge of $1,000 a student can avoid the debt by paying 
$800 - this means that students paying later take on an additional 25 per cent, that is, $200/800. 
   10
(ii)  In the circumstances in which loans are offered in part for income support 
(as they are in New Zealand, but not in Australia), the case for having an 
on-going real rate of interest such as suggested by Barr is strong, since 
otherwise some borrowers will be able to use their loans to make profits in 
the commercial money market, at taxpayer’s expense; and 
 
(iii)  There might be a case for a surcharge instead of an on-going real rate of 
interest for tuition charges if it is the case that borrowers are averse to 
having rapidly increasing debts in times of on-going low incomes, a 
possibility that seems to be recognized through most loan schemes having 
a so-called “forgiveness” clause, after which all the outstanding loan is 
written off. 
 
We are unable to determine with confidence what the correct form of a real rate of 
interest should be for income contingent tuition charges in the Thai context, so in 
what follows we have designed two alternatives forms of the suggested alternative to 
TICAL1 and TICAL2, and this is known as ILLUSTRATIVE. The first form is called 
ILLUSTRATIVE1, and this variant imposes the same rule as HECS by adding a 
surcharge of 25 per cent to the debt, after which the real rate of interest is zero (that is, 
with an on-going CPI adjustment only).  
 
The second is called ILLUSTRATIVE2, which has a conventional real rate of interest 
imposed on the debt, of 3 per cent real per annum, with adjustments beginning 
immediately after the debt is incurred
9. It is a significant goal of our research to 
determine the extent to which these different approaches matter with respect to the 
extent of taxpayer subsidies, and whether the size of the debt matters to an assessment 
of the relative appeal of these different approaches. This last point might become very 
important if the income contingent loan system is allowed to move to the private 
sector where tuition charges are much higher 
 
 
4  The Data and Earnings Function Results  
 
4 (i) Motivation 
 
We are interested in estimating earnings functions in order to provide structure and 
understanding of the lifetime earnings streams of male and female graduates, on 
average. This will assist in an overall understanding of the Thai graduate labor 
market, allowing insight into increments to wages from additional education, and the 
internal rate of return to investing in a university education. In this sense our single 
cross-section provides restricted but complementary information for the exercises 
reported in Lathapipat (2008). 
 
More significantly for the policy aspect of our exercise, the OLS results will allow us 
to determine the extent of interest rate subsidies on average from our four different 
variants of income contingent loans for Thailand. This is done by using predicted 
smoothed average earnings to ascertain the timing and structure of loan repayments 
under different debt obligation parameters. 
                                                 
9 Very roughly this is about the long term government bond rate, at least for Australia.   11
 
It is also interesting and important for subsidy calculations to examine the extent to 
which interest rate subsidies vary between debtor groups with quite different ex post 
income levels. This is approached in a separate exercise explained and reported below 
by truncating the earnings data, our preferred method to the use of quantile 
regressions for reasons to be explained. Our method reveals that the use of OLS to 
determine interest rate subsidies from different forms of income contingent loans has 
the potential to overstate aggregate loan repayments and thus to understate loan 
subsidies. The differences are not trivial, and this matters for the policy debate. 
 
4 (ii) The data 
 
We use cross-section individual survey data from the Labor Force Survey (LFS), 
collected in the third quarter of 2006. The LFS is administered by the National 
Statistical Office, and it contains information on individuals’ characteristics such as 
age, marital status, household size, educational attainment, and geographical location, 
as well as job-related information such as employment status, occupation, earnings, 
and hours of work. The LFS covers every province in Thailand and has a total sample 
size of over two hundred thousand; thus, it is the most comprehensive data set for 
labor market available in Thailand to be used for analyzing returns to education at the 
aggregate level. Summary statistics are presented in Table 2.  
 
Our analysis is restricted to individuals aged from 15 to 60
10. We have omitted: a very 
small number of individuals whose earnings are significantly different from the 
population at large; the self-employed; part-time workers
11; and those who work in the 
agricultural sector. 
 
The major points are as follows. There are 19,856 males and 17,491 females in the 
sample. Earnings per hour are calculated as weekly earnings received from the main 
job divided by total hours worked in the main job per week., and gross hourly wages 
in 2006 for males and females are 52.47 and 54.68 Baht, and we have adjusted these 
to derive average annual earnings for men and women, of 106,769 and 108,385 Baht. 
 
Binary variables (0,1) are used to represent the highest educational qualification of 
each individual in the sample and in the econometric work we use individuals who did 
not complete primary school as the reference point for comparisons. About 18 and 13 
per cent of males and females have the highest qualification recorded as being 
primary school level or lower, and about 32 and 29 per cent of males and females 
have attained lower secondary or upper secondary education. The receipt of an 
undergraduate qualification differs markedly between males and females, with the 
proportions being 17 and 33 per cent for males and females
12. Average hours of work 
per week are 45.7 and 44.9 for men and women.  
 
One drawback of the LFS is that respondents are not asked how long an individual has 
been employed in paid work, an important variable in the estimation of the earnings 
functions. To deal with this issue we have constructed the usual proxy, known as 
                                                 
10 60 is the official retirement age in Thailand. 
11 A part-time worker is defined as a person who works less than 20 hours per week. 
12 These sex differences in university participation are commonly found in Thailand. It is an area of 
future research by one of the authors of this paper.   12
“potential experience”, which is the difference between age and the sum of total years 
of schooling and the minimum age required to begin school. Based on this calculation, 
average potential experience is 19.4 years for males and 17.3 years for females. 
 
Table 2 
Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
Variable Definition  Male Female 










Gross hourly wages from main 
job in 2006 (Baht) 
 






Gross annual earnings  in 2006 
(Baht) 
 








    
Incomplete 
school 













Primary school  Dummy=1 if highest 












Dummy=1 if highest 











Dummy=1 if highest 









Diploma  Dummy=1 if highest 









Undergraduate  Dummy=1 if highest 









Postgraduate  Dummy=1 if highest 













    
Hours per week  Hours of work per week in 
main job 
 
45.72    8.10  44.87      7.86 
Potential 
Experience 
(Maximum) time in paid work 
in years 
 
19.38    10.89  17.32    10.14 
Number of 
Observations 
  19,856 17,491 
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4  (iii) OLS earnings functions 
 
The standard earnings equation is used in this study and is of the following form: 
 
ln i w =+
'
ii X βε  
 
where  1,2,3,..., in =  represent  individuals,  i w   is the gross hourly earning of 
individual i, and 
'
i X  is a vector of characteristics that determine earnings. 
 
We employ three variations of the model: the first uses years of schooling as a proxy 
for educational attainment; the second variant uses the education dummies described 
earlier; and the third extends the second model to include interaction terms between 
education dummies and potential experience. The last of these is essentially a 
relaxation of the restriction imposed in the second model that constrains returns to 
experience to be identical between education levels. The estimations for these models 
are carried out separately for males and females. 
 
Based on the years of schooling coefficient model, on average, the earnings increases 
for one additional year of education are about 11.2 and 12.9 percent for males and 
females. Our estimates are reasonably close to the result from previous studies. The 
results from this study and selected previous studies are now shown in Table 3 (see 
Appendix A for the regression result). 
 
Table 3 
Selected Comparisons of Returns to Schooling Estimates for Thailand 




Return to one additional year 




























1972  Returns to Education by 














Source: Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002) and authors’ (2008) estimate. 
 
Results from the dummies-and-interaction terms are reported in Appendix B. The 
findings from this model are consistent with economic theory; that is, earnings 
increase with education and experience, with the rate of increase with experience   14
falling over time. The earnings-experience slopes are relatively steep for graduates, 
although not by much; this is as expected, a prediction which follows from the general 
view that university graduates are more likely to be in higher training jobs with 
concomitant steeper earnings-experience slopes.  
 
The percentage differences in earnings associated with educational qualifications are 
shown in Table 3. The reference group is made up of individuals who did not 
complete school. 
 
The data from Table 3 show that on average, without any prior market experience, a 
male primary school graduate earns 15 per cent higher than a male without any formal 
qualifications, and this commensurate figure for females is 14 per cent. A male and 
female with lower secondary education experience higher earnings by 25 and 22 per 
cent. Upper secondary qualification increase earnings by 32 and 35 per cent for males 
and females. Average male and female diploma holders earn 58 and 55 percent than 
the “incomplete school” individual, with the earnings advantage for university 
graduates earning are 78 and 86 percent for males and females. These earnings 
advantages for postgraduate males and females are 102 and 110 per cent. 
 
Table 3 
Percentage Differences in Earnings 




























  4 (iii) Age earnings profiles and internal rates of return 
 
  We use the estimation results in Appendix  B to construct age-earning profiles
13. 
These profiles are used to derive the earning path for male and female with upper 
secondary qualifications and undergraduate qualifications
14. The profile for average 
males and females are shown in Figures 1 and 2. These profiles assume that the full 
working life of an average upper secondary high school graduate is 42 years, from age 
18 to 60. For those who decide to undertake undergraduate study for 4 years, the full 
                                                 







⎛⎞ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ = . See 
Wooldridge (2006) for details. 
14 Observations with age greater than 55 years were dropped due the presence of several large outliers.    15
working life is reduced to 38 years, from age 22 to 60. As well, we adjusted the age-
earning profiles by 1.5 percent to capture productivity growth, with the choice of this 















































































Female Upper Secondary School Graduate
Annual earning (Bath)
 
As can be seen from the figures, earnings increase at a decreasing rate with age 
(experience) for both upper secondary graduates and university graduates. The age-
earning profiles for both male and female university graduates are (slightly) steeper 
than they are for secondary school graduates. It is of comfort to note that these 
relationships are familiar with respect to the findings for a large number of countries 
at different points of time.  
   16
We can use these results to calculate the so-called internal rate of return to investment 
in university education, a measure of the value in earnings terms of process. Formally, 
the IRR is defined as the discount rate that equates the present value of additional 
benefits from the investment to the present value of the cost of obtaining the 
additional education. The benefits are additional earnings from higher education; and 
the costs are tuition fees plus the opportunity cost of not working in paid employment 
after the completion of upper secondary school. It should be noted that the result from 
the IRR estimate is contingent upon both the cost of investment and the earnings 
streams.  
 
In our estimates we assume that university graduates undertake study on a full-time 
basis for four years and receive zero incomes at that time. The calculations have been 
carried out for a diversity of tuition fees, from 36,000 Baht to 350,000 Baht per 
program, which reflect very broadly the current range of Thai higher education annual 
tuition charges for different institutions. Table 5 shows the results with the IRRs, and 
these range from 8.0 to 12.8 per cent per annum for males, and 4.5 to 7.9 per cent per 
annum for females, estimates which are roughly in line with international experience 
(see Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2002). This familiarity should leave us with some 




IRR Estimates (per cent per annum) 
 






























* Average estimates from various universities. 
  
To this point the analysis has been based on average age-earning profiles derived from 
OLS estimations. In order to better capture the heterogeneity of outcomes across 
different age-earning groups, a truncated approach to estimation has been employed 
and this is now explained and the results are shown. A main reason that this more 
disaggregated approach is likely to be of considerable importance for the policy 
debate is that income contingent loan schemes typically have a first income threshold 
of repayment; this can mean that a small proportion of the graduate population does 
not repay (even the nominal debt) in full and this may have marked effects on 
estimations of interest rate subsidies that will not show up with the use of OLS. 
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4 (iv) Deriving truncated age-earnings profiles  
 
While it is of considerable interest to understand the earnings relationships at the 
mean of the data, which is what is happening with the use of OLS, a fuller 
understanding of the implications of different income contingent loan schemes 
requires a more disaggregated method. We have approached this by doing the analysis 
separately for three parts of the lifetime graduate earnings distributions, and have thus 
divided the earnings data into three groups by year of age and sex: the bottom third, 
the middle, and the top third of earnings
15. 
 
There is an important reason for considering the earnings and loan experiences for 
different parts of the earnings distribution, which is that for TICAL1, TICAL2 and 
ILLUSTRATIVE1 (but not ILLUSTRATIVE2)
16  there will be different subsidies 
depending on the lifetime earnings streams of hypothetical graduates; it is of interest 
to determine how big these are, and how much they differ between those earning low, 
medium and high lifetime incomes.  
 
The truncation exercise provides an indication of the both the distributional effects of 
policy regimes, and related to this the possible future contributions of taxpayers given 
marked movements in graduate income distributions. More significantly, and as noted 
above, when loan schemes have the potential to have less than full collection from 
some parts of the graduate earnings distribution, these needs to be explicitly modeled 
in order that we estimate implicit interest rate subsidies properly. 
 
However, there is a major limitation of this approach. It is the implicit assumption that 
graduates remain in the low, middle or top third of the earnings distribution 
throughout their lives, and this is clearly not going to be the case. Even so, the 
approach employed allows us to determine upper boundaries of implicit interest rate 
subsidies (for the lowest one third of earnings) and lower boundaries of implicit 
interest rate subsidies (for the highest one third of earnings).  
 
The estimated parameters from the truncated OLS estimations are shown in Appendix 
C and these have been used to construct age-earning profiles for the three different 
graduate earnings groupings
17. These are shown for males and females in Figures 3 
and 4. 
 
The results illustrated in the figures show quite different earnings outcomes for 
graduates by age and sex. For both sexes it is apparently the case that those in the 
highest third of the earnings distribution start out with earnings that are about two and 
                                                 
15 An alternative but similar way to have addressed this issue would be through the use of quantile 
regression techniques, which effectively divide the distributions into earnings categories. However, this 
approach assigns weights to all the data points in the sample, with the weights being lower the further 
the data point is from the group under consideration. Because of this weighting procedure we are 
unconvinced that such an approach usefully helps us understand the impact on subsidies of graduates 
being in different thirds of the earnings distribution. Our approach using truncations implicitly assigns 
a weight in the regression of zero to all data points outside the group. 
16 This is because ILLUSTRATIVE2 imposes the same real rate of interest on the borrowings as the 
real discount rate, and this must mean that there are no subsidies involved for any income groups, so 
long as all members of the group eventually pay off their debts in full. 
17 The profiles are adjusted for productivity change by the same method used for adjusting the OLS 
predictions.   18
half times higher than is the case for those in the bottom third of the distribution, and 
that this advantage increases considerably as age increases; at age 50, for example, the 
earnings advantage of the top third compared to the bottom third has grown to about 
five times for females and to about three and a half times for males. The size of these 
differences suggest strongly that estimated variations in implicit interest rate subsidies 
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5  Loan Repayments and Interest Subsidies for Four ICLs 
 
5 (i) The implicit subsidy calculation: concepts and assumptions 
 
From a financial point of view the efficiency and sustainability of loan programs 
depend significantly upon the level of loan recoverability. In turn this is linked to the 
repayment conditions, the most important being: (i) the level and form of the real rate 
of interest on the debt; (ii) the first income threshold of repayment; and (iii) and the 
rates of repayment as a proportion of income.  
 
The difference between the present value of the sum of the repayment stream and the 
present value of the tuition fee paid through the loan scheme is called an “implicit 
subsidy” and it is likely to be an unintended consequence as a result of the design of 
the financing scheme. The word “implicit” is used to distinguish this form of subsidy 
from the intended tuition fee subsidy usually provided to public universities.  
 
For our exercises, and those reported in Chapman et al. (2008), we used the following 























T = tuition fee paid in year t
 t = year of tuition fee payment
P = loan repayment in year l









 to repay the loan




An implication of the above formula is that a loan package that takes longer time to 
pay will result in a lower present value of repayment, and thus a higher subsidy, for 
all schemes except ILLUSTRATIVE2
19. This is an important issue for loan design 
and, as is shown below, it is a critical point with respect to whether or not it is 
possible to develop a workable income contingent loan scheme for Thailand in 
circumstances in which debts are much higher than the low levels modeled here 
initially. 
 
                                                 
18  Subsequently and fortunately we ascertained that it is the same formula derived by Adrian Ziderman 
(Ziderman, 2003). 
19 So long as the nominal debts are paid in full using a real rate of interest equal to the discount rate 
(both are set at 3 per cent per annum for ILLUSTRATIVE2) must result in implicit interest rate 
subsidies of zero.   20
In what now follows we present calculations of the implicit subsidy with respect to 
the collection of tuition of four possible income contingent loan schemes for Thailand, 
described above and known as TICAL1, TICAL2, ILLUSTRATIVE1 and 
ILLUSTRATIVE2. The assumptions used in estimating the subsidies are as follows: 
 
(i)  Real interest rates: Zero for TICAL1 and TICAL2, as proposed for the 
original TICAL. A 25 per cent tuition surcharge with a zero real 
interest rate afterwards for ILLUSTRATIVE1, which is the same as is 
the case for HECS. A 3 per cent real rate of interest calculated from the 
beginning of the debt for ILLUSTRATIVE2, to represent a 
conventional method of covering the government’s cost of borrowing. 
 




(iii)  Full employment. The hypothetical graduates are assumed to be 
engaged in full-time year round paid work.  
 
(iv)  Tuition fee (initially): The tuition fee is set at 100,000 Baht for a four 
year undergraduate degree. This is the approximately equal to the 
weighted average tuition fee of public and private university in 
Thailand, and is equivalent to the tuition imposed in the Chapman et 
al. (2008) exercises. This assumption is relaxed later. 
 
As noted above, we approach the interest rate subsidy calculations with both OLS and 
truncated estimations, beginning with the former. 
 
5 (ii) The streams of repayments and interest rate subsidies: OLS 
 
Using these assumptions and average earning profiles predicted from the OLS 
coefficients, we are able to construct repayment streams under all four schemes. The 
annual payments are shown in Figures 5 and 6. 
 
                                                 
20 The choice of discount rate is somewhat subjective, but can be justified with reference to some data. 
For example, in Australia from December 2001-04 accountants used a 5.6 per cent nominal discount 
rate, and the average inflation rate was 2.3 per cent during that period, giving a real interest rate of 3.3 
per cent per annum. Further, the real long-term bond rate is about the same as this. PST also used a real 
rate of discount of 3 per cent. 
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Figure 5 


































































(3% real interest)   22
Figure 6 









































































(3% real interest)   23
A critical reason that the repayment streams differ is that the first income repayment 
threshold for the two versions of TICAL is almost twice as high as is the case for the 
two versions of ILLUSTRATIVE. The very high first threshold means that under 
TICAL1 an average male does not start to repay the debt until he is 26 years old, and 
the non-payment period of an average female is even longer with repayment not 
beginning until she is 32 years old. It is also worth noting that the presumed 
indexation arrangement for the former TICAL is very important to the timing of 
repayment streams, with the unindexed version resulting in repayments beginning 3 
and 6 years earlier for males and females. A final obvious point is that the different 
forms of the real interest rate for ILLUSTRATIVE1 and ILLUSTRATIVE2 appear to 
deliver almost identical repayment streams.  
 
All the above points are broadly true for both males and females, with the main 
differences in the results lying in the timing of repayments. Because they earn lower 
incomes, females start to repay later with TICAL 1 and TICAL2, and repay longer 
and at lower rates with ILLUSTRATIVE1 and ILLUSTRATIVE2. 
 
Table 7 reports the implicit subsidies associated with these streams of repayment in 
combination with the interest rate parameters of each of the schemes.  
 
Table 7 






(25 per cent 
surcharge) 
ILLUST2 
























The major points with respect to the implicit subsidies from the four income 
contingent loan policies are: 
 
(i)  Having a zero real rate of interest, in combination with very high first 
income repayment thresholds, results in the high implicit interest rate 
subsides for both TICAL1 and TICAL2, of around 30-40 per cent for the 
former, and 25-34 per cent for the latter. 
 
(ii)  While the TICAL subsidies can be considered to be high and reflective of 
less than perfect design, it is worth recording that these subsidies are much 
less than those reported in Chapman et al. (2008) for the SLF, of around 
60 per cent. 
 
(iii)  It is clear that having a form of real rates of interest for ILLUSTRATIVE1 
and ILLUSTRATIVE2 have a marked effect on calculations of subsidies 
compared to the two versions of TICAL; and 
 
(iv)   It is apparent that a 25 per cent surcharge with no further real interest rate 
adjustment (ILLUSTRATIVE1) delivers about the same implicit subsidies   24
of about zero
21 as having an on-going real rate of interest of 3 per cent per 
annum
22 (ILLUSTRATIVE2).  
 
These findings are an important part of our contribution. The results from the use of 
basic econometric techniques promotes for discussion the advantages of an income 
contingent loan with a relatively low first income threshold of repayment, and with 
some form of a real rate of interest. However, the approach adopted thus far only 
reveals subsidies for the schemes at the means of the data by age and sex, since our 
method uses OLS earnings function results. We now move to consider the subsidies 
associated with the schemes for quite different lifetime earnings distributions. 
 
5 (iii) The streams of repayments and interest rate subsidies: truncations 
 
What now follows illustrates the streams of repayments and implicit subsidies of the 
three different lifetime earnings groups for both sexes illustrated above in Figures 3 
and 4: high earners (Q75), median earners (Q50), and low earners (Q25)
23. Table 8 
shows the implicit subsidies for males and females for each of the three lifetime 
earnings distributions for the four loan schemes. 
 
Table 8 
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An important aspect of the data from Table 8 needs to be explained, and this relates to 
the measure of the so-called “average”. The calculation is the average of the three 
                                                 
21  The slight difference between the subsidies found for ILLUSTRATIVE2 and zero is the result only 
of a rounding error. 
22  This is very close to the results found for the HECS system for public sector undergraduates 
(Chapman and Lounkaew, 2008). 
23 The repayment streams data are available from the authors.   25
cohort-specific implicit taxpayer subsidy calculations and can be interpreted with the 
use of the following example with respect to the findings for males under the TICAL1 
scheme. 
 
The results suggest that if there are 100 men taking TICAL1 loans, around 33 of them 
will earn in the bottom third of graduate earnings for the period in which the loan is 
collected, and for this group the estimated subsidy is about 77 per cent; an important 
part of this subsidy can be attributed to the fact that when the retirement age is 
reached the loan is not paid off in full (in nominal terms). There will also be 33 men 
in the top third of graduate earnings in the period in which the loan is collected and 
for this group the estimated subsidy is about 19 per cent. Combined with the subsidy 
of about 25 per cent for the middle third of the male graduate earnings distribution we 
can then calculate the (weighted) average for males as a whole under TICAL1. In this 
case the answer is about 40 per cent ((77 + 25 + 19)/3). 
 
The strength of this calculation compared to the use of earnings data at the mean only 
is that it broadly takes into account the importance of subsidy differences across the 
earnings distribution. This must matter because income contingent loans require no 
repayments from debtors at the time that they experience low earnings, meaning that 
there are important asymmetries with respect to collection above and below the first 
(and later) income threshold at which repayments exist. Our method is necessarily 
more accurate than the estimates using OLS only.  
 
The major points with respect to the implicit subsidies from the four income 
contingent loan policies taking into account the earnings distributions are: 
 
(i)  In all cases, except for males in ILLUST1 and ILLUST2, estimates of 
implicit interest rate subsidies are higher than is the case for the 
calculations done at the mean only; 
 
(ii)  With TICAL1 the subsidies are now calculated to be around 40-55 per cent 
for males and females, which are not very different to the estimates from 
Chapman et al. (2008) for the SLF of about 65 per cent; 
 
(iii)  With TICAL2 the subsidy for males remains relatively low, at around 28 
per cent, but increases to over 50 per cent for females; 
 
(iv)  With both ILLUSTRATIVE schemes the subsidies remain at around zero 
for males, an interesting component of this result being that for males in 
the top third of the earnings distribution under ILLUSTRATIVE1 there is 
a negative subsidy of 9 per cent. This is because the 25 per cent surcharge 
on the debt represents an effective real rate of interest in excess of 3 per 
cent per annum; and 
 
(v)  With both ILLUSTRATIVE schemes the average subsidy for females 
increases to about 18 per cent, and this is due almost entirely to the fact 
that the subsidies for females in the bottom third of the earnings 
distribution are very large (59 and 53 per cent for ILLUSTRATIVE1 and 
ILLUSTRATIVE2). This important finding can be traced to the fact that a 
large proportion of women experiencing low earnings have unpaid debt at   26
the end of their working lives and thus the end of their debt repayments, of 
around 45 per cent. 
 
The final point above is critical to our understanding of the potential for having an 
efficacious income contingent loan for Thailand. It means that, with reasonable 
repayment parameters and a real rate of interest, there remain important subsidies 
associated with income contingent loan schemes for some groups. This is because the 
lifetime earnings of some graduates are not sufficient to repay the debt in full, and this 
is traceable to the fact that Thailand’s per capita real incomes are relatively low when 
considered in an international context. This is unlike the situation in many countries 
with income contingent loans such as Australia, New Zealand and the UK. 
 
The results of Table 8 imply that schemes with design arrangements similar to TICAL 
are associated with very considerable subsidies and their level might be such as to 
suggest that alternative income contingent loan policies are more appropriate. While 
the subsidies for schemes with forms of a real rate of interest and a much lower first 
income threshold of repayment are not insignificant, for the policy debate it could be 
concluded that arrangements of this kind are acceptable with respect to taxpayer 
contributions.  
 
However, it needs to be recognized that our subsidy calculations have been 
undertaken for a total tuition debt of 100,000 baht, and it will certainly be the case 
that with higher charges - and thus higher debt - these subsidies will increase. This 
issue matters with respect to the coverage of an income contingent loan for Thailand 
because outside the public sector university tuition charges are generally and 
significantly higher. 
 
5 (iv) Interest rate subsidies for higher debts  
 
The exercises reported above involve estimations of implicit subsidies from income 
contingent loans of various forms for a total tuition charge of 100,000 Baht. While 
this can be argued to be appropriate and typical for public sector universities in 
Thailand, the story is different in the case of the private sector where charges are 
much higher than this.  
 
Our best estimate of a typical tuition charge for the private sector is a total of around 
350,000 Baht
24. Assuming an income contingent loan facility is offered by the 
government to cover this charge we are able to estimate the implicit subsidies 
associated with the four schemes. The calculations are presented in Table 9. 
 
The main points from Table 9 are: 
 
(i)  With a much higher charge of 350,000 Baht the implicit subsidies are 
higher for all four schemes, although the increases for TICAL1 and 
TICAL2, to between 44 and 63 per cent, are not as high as the increases 
for ILLUSTRATIVE1 and ILLUSTRATIVE2. This is due to the fact that 
both TICAL arrangements involve quite high collection rates (of up to 12 
per cent of income) at higher levels of earnings; 
                                                 
24 This is about the same as tuition fee for undergraduate business program at Assumption University.   27
 
(ii)  With the higher charge there is now very little difference between the 
subsidies associated with TICAL1 and TICAL2 and those found for the 
SLF and reported in Chapman et al. (2008); 
 
(iii)  Having a surcharge of 25 per cent on the loan and no real rate of interest 
after the debt is incurred (ILLUSTRATIVE1) is associated with quite high 
subsidies of around 38 and 51 per cent for males and females; and 
 
(iv)  Even with an income contingent loan with an on-going real rate of interest 
of 3 per cent per annum (ILLUSTRATIVE2) high charges are associated 




Implicit Interest Rate Subsidies for Low, Median and High Earnings Groups 
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surcharge) 
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Q25 93.55* 66.38* 49.29 50.41* 
 
Q50 40.55 35.72 35.18  0.00 
 
Q75 30.30 28.47 30.04  0.00 
   









100.00* 84.33* 86.58* 
 
Q50 54.28 45.15 38.08 16.07* 
 
Q75 36.10 30.62 31.42  0.00 
  
Average 63.46 58.59 51.28 34.23 
 
These findings are very important for Thailand’s higher education financing debate, 
since they imply that widespread reform of student loans including their provision for 
relatively high cost courses is likely to involve sizeable taxpayer subsidies. We have 
not determined the possible overall costs for the government of broadly based 
coverage, and these might not be such as to undermine the basis for a universal 
income contingent loan facility since we note that private universities apparently 
enroll around 15 per cent of all undergraduates
25. 
 
On the other hand, the income contingent loan schemes under consideration for our 
exercises have involved debts for tuition only. Since additional loans for income 
                                                 
25 Source: National Statistical Year Book 2006   28
support would seem to be a propitious aspect of higher education financing reform as 
well the level of debts modeled of 350,000 Baht could well be required for the public 





There is an on-going and very important debate in Thailand concerning higher 
education financing policy. For the ten years prior to 2007 a traditional mortgage-type 
loan, known as the Student Loan Fund, was in operation, and after being suspended a 
system very similar to the SLF was reintroduced in 2007. Chapman, Lounkaew, 
Polsiri, Sarachitti and Sitthiponpanich (2008) analyze the SLF with respect to both 
taxpayer interest rate subsidies and graduate loan repayment hardships. As found also 
by Ziderman (2003), it is clear that the SLF has very high interest rate subsidies and, 
consistent with this, it is associated with low repayment difficulties for former 
students. 
 
The main contributions of the current paper are as follows. First, we present a 
comparison in conceptual terms of the costs and benefits of schemes such as the SLF 
with the other main alternative, income contingent loans. Income contingent loans 
have advantages over mortgage-type loans in terms of providing insurance against 
both default and repayment hardships. However, a critical issue concerning this 
approach for many countries concerns the efficacy of collection on the basis of a 
student’s future income stream, it being the case that quite sophisticated institutional 
mechanisms are required. It is unclear to us whether or not the Thai income tax and/or 
pension collection schemes are such as to make effective and operative the collection 
of an income contingent loan. 
 
Using the same data, econometric approaches and accounting methods as those 
employed by Chapman et al. (2008), we are able to estimate the implicit interest rate 
subsidies for four different income contingent loan arrangements, differing 
importantly with respect to collection parameters and interest rate regimes. For the 
first time in analyses of the effects of income contingent loans we demonstrate that 
the use of averages provides misleadingly low estimates of the extent of interest rate 
subsidies. As well, it appears that schemes with high first income thresholds of 
collection, and without a real rate of interest, are associated with significant interest 
rate subsidies, and for high debts these subsidies are not very dissimilar to those 
estimated for the SLF. 
 
Further, it is also apparent that, for relatively low levels of debt income, contingent 
loan policies with relatively low first income thresholds of repayment and with real 
rates of interest can be designed to be workable for Thailand in an aggregate financial 
sense. However, as debt levels increase so too do the interest rate subsidies with an 
important part of this result being due to the fact that Thai graduate incomes per capita 
are just not high enough for many groups to be able to repay all the debt before they 
leave the labor force.  
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Some important caveats are warranted. One is that we have not taken into account 
loan losses through poor collection outcomes, and this has the clear potential to 
repayments and thus increase subsidies. Related to this is that graduate unemployment 
rates are quite high for the first several years after the completion of a university 
degree, and from our calculations with the LFS remain as high as 5 per cent even five 
years after labor force participation begins. Taking this into account would necessarily 
increase subsidy estimates, and preliminary work in this area suggests that the figures 
would be about 5 percentage points higher. 
 
Finally, it has to be stressed that our conclusions are derived on the basis of particular 
design rules concerning different income contingent loan approaches, and this should 
matter very significantly to the debate concerning the efficacy of income contingent 
loan approaches in Thailand. The important point is that subsidy calculations are very 
sensitive to choices concerning: the first income threshold of repayment; the 
proportions of income required for loan repayment; and real interest rates. The next 
step is to ascertain the extent to which our broad conclusions are reinforced or 
compromised with alternative loan design parameters. 
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Appendix A 
Years of Schooling Model 
 

















-5.17 -0.178** -8.13 
Constant 
 








*denotes statistical significance at the 5 percent level. 
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Appendix B 
Dummy Variables and Interaction Terms model 
 
Variable Female  Male 
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Experience 
 




-0.001** -34.55 -0.001** -42.79 
Primary 
 
0.150** 3.65 0.146** 3.83 
Lower Secondary 
 
0.254** 7.28 0  .221** 5.49 
Upper Secondary 
 
0.315** 9.64 0.350** 8.33 
Diploma 
 
0.577** 11.79 0.548**  9.26 
Undergraduate 
 
0.776** 28.39 0.859** 19.37 
Post Graduate  1.025** 
 
15.95 1.104** 11.48 
Experience*Primary/100 
 




0.006** 4.92 0.007** 3.58 
Experience*LowerSecondary/100 
 




0.810** 8.31 0.734** 9.14 
Experience*UpperSecondary/100 
 

















0.646** 4.53 -0.205**  -1.51 
Experience*Undergraduate/100 
 




0.845** 10.19 0.822**  7.70 
Experience*Postgraduate/100 0.026** 
 




-1.49 -0.861** -2.24 
Constant 
 








*denotes statistical significance at the 5 percent level. 








Truncated OLS by Income Groups 
 
Variable Male  Female 
Q25 Q50 Q75 Q25 Q50 Q75 
Constant  2.5382**  2.5804** 2.6332** 2.5621** 2.6190** 2.6571** 
Educational 
attainment 
       
Primary  0.1117**  0.1553** 0.2443** 0.0744** 0.1154** 0.1840** 
Lower  secondary  0.2314**  0.3002** 0.4367** 0.1857** 0.2735** 0.4003** 
Upper  secondary  0.3874**  0.5331** 0.7328** 0.3542** 0.4740** 0.6615** 
Diploma  0.6875**  0.8419** 1.0061** 0.6610** 0.8331** 1.0663** 
Undergraduate  0.8647**  1.0676** 1.2960** 0.8280** 0.9467** 1.126** 
Postgraduate  1.7256**  1.6819** 1.5987** 1.7043** 1.8011** 1.8186** 
Experience         
Experience  0.0337**  0.0454** 0.0506** 0.0253** 0.0312** 0.0354** 
Experience
2  -0.0004**  -0.0005** -0.0004** -0.0003** -0.0003** -0.0002** 
Undergrad*Exper  0.0262**  0.0196** 0.0142** 0.0266** 0.0376** 0.0389** 
Undergrad*Exper
2 0.00001  -0.0001  -0.0004**  0.0002**  -0.0003**  -0.0006** 
Observations  19,856    17,491 
R
2  0.2838  0.3736 0.4341 0.3950 0.4950 0.5301 
*denotes statistical significance at the 5 percent level. 
**denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level. 
       
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 